Forced, how? Threat of detention beyond the 9 hour window?
If so, it's easy to speculate I would call their bluff and refuse. But in the situation, probably not so easy.
What about using a hidden volume in TrueCrypt for plausible deniability? [1]
I suppose that would work effectively for documents. There's no plausible deniability for stuff like Facebook and Gmail. They can easily see if you gave them access to the real/full thing, or not.
However given the revelations David Miranda of all people would have to assume his Gmail, FB, et al have _already_ been compromised.[2] So the only interesting, still-private stuff would be any documents.
"The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), Part III, activated by ministerial order in October 2007, requires persons to supply decrypted information and/or keys to government representatives. Failure to disclose carries a maximum penalty of two years in jail."(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_disclosure_law#United_Kingd...).
TrueCrypt is no escape if they have reasonable suspicion there is a hidden volume. And you will have to prove that there isn't one.
Forced, how? Threat of detention beyond the 9 hour window?
If so, it's easy to speculate I would call their bluff and refuse. But in the situation, probably not so easy.
What about using a hidden volume in TrueCrypt for plausible deniability? [1]
I suppose that would work effectively for documents. There's no plausible deniability for stuff like Facebook and Gmail. They can easily see if you gave them access to the real/full thing, or not.
However given the revelations David Miranda of all people would have to assume his Gmail, FB, et al have _already_ been compromised.[2] So the only interesting, still-private stuff would be any documents.
[1]: http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/plausible-deniability
[2]: Not that this makes it right to demand the passwords at LHR.