> > Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem: any sufficiently rich formal system, together with an interpretation, has strings which are true but unprovable.
Somewhat oddly, this is actually technically correct - a "sufficiently rich" system is one that can distinguish true versus false statements of Peano Arithmetic, and a inconsistent system, by the principle of explosion, can prove any statement, so cannot distinguish statements of Peano Arithmetic (eg, 1+1=2 and 1+1=3 are both provable), and hence is not sufficiently rich.
That's a somewhat unintuitive way of looking at it in practice, though.
That's only true for systems where the principle of explosion actually holds though, isn't it? So it wouldn't apply to paraconsistent systems.
In the end, Gödel is actually giving us a choice: Either accept incompleteness or accept inconsistency. Of course it's true that historically incompleteness has been perceived as the only viable choice, but at least a few paraconsistent logicians like Graham Priest have argued for (non-explosive) inconsistency instead.
Somewhat oddly, this is actually technically correct - a "sufficiently rich" system is one that can distinguish true versus false statements of Peano Arithmetic, and a inconsistent system, by the principle of explosion, can prove any statement, so cannot distinguish statements of Peano Arithmetic (eg, 1+1=2 and 1+1=3 are both provable), and hence is not sufficiently rich.
That's a somewhat unintuitive way of looking at it in practice, though.